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In nature and society problems arise when different interests are difficult to reconcile, which are
modeled in game theory. While most applications assume uncorrelated games, a more detailed
modeling is necessary to consider the correlations that influence the decisions of the players. The
current theory for correlated games, however, enforces the players to obey the instructions from a
third party or ”correlation device” to reach equilibrium, but this cannot be achieved for all initial
correlations. We extend here the existing framework of correlated games and find that there are
other interesting and previously unknown Nash equilibria that make use of correlations to obtain
the best payoff. This is achieved by allowing the players the freedom to follow or not to follow the
suggestions of the correlation device. By assigning independent probabilities to follow every possible
suggestion, the players engage in a response game that turns out to have a rich structure of Nash
equilibria that goes beyond the correlated equilibrium and mixed-strategy solutions. We determine
the Nash equilibria for all possible correlated Snowdrift games, which we find to be describable by
Ising Models in thermal equilibrium. We believe that our approach paves the way to a study of
correlations in games that uncovers the existence of interesting underlying interaction mechanisms,
without compromising the independence of the players.
Introduction - Game theory [1] has been used as a
powerful tool to model problems from diverse research
areas, such as biology [2–4], economics [5, 6], politics [7]
and social sciences [8]. Many applications involve uncor-
related coordination games [9, 10], such as the Prisoners
Dilemma [11, 12] and the Snowdrift games [13, 14],
where the players make their decisions independently.
The Snowdrift game is of particular interest because
has it been shown to model biological conflict [13], yet
the optimal solution of this game is reached when the
players are allowed to communicate, using correlations.
Thus, to further advance the applications of games to
real life situations, a more complex treatment is required
[15, 16]. In that direction, an improvement can be made
if we do not to assume from the start that a game
is uncorrelated, but consider that the decisions that
the players make can be informed both by the payoff
function and by underlying correlations in the system.
A prominent example is that of Evolutionary Stable
Strategies [2]: while the analysis has been successful at
describing actions at the level of what the outcomes
are, namely the phenotype, what originates these
behaviors, namely the connections with the genotype,
is a field of active research [4] and may lie precisely in
introducing correlations. Another area that has seen
much interest recently consists of having several players
playing games on a network against each other, and so
they must make a choice to optimize their payoff. If the
players are correlated we expect that we can describe
this by an Ising model in a magnetic field, with the
correlated probabilities corresponding to a Boltzman
distribution. For all these diverse applications, it is
thus crucial that the correlations do not completely
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determine the actions, but merely inform them. To this
end, we analyze what outcomes arise when we give the
players the freedom to act on the correlations. This
is an improvement on the current theory of correlated
games, which has a much more limited action range.
Furthermore, we describe how to introduce this free-
dom for each player independently using the Ising model.
We consider, without loss of generality, symmetric, two
by two, coordination games. The players have access to
the payoff matrix in Fig. 1, that settles how much reward
each player receives given the actions of all the players.
Player 1 receives the payoffs on the left side of the comma,
while player two receives the payoff on the right side of
the comma, dependent on the two strategies chosen. The
different games are defined by the range of the parame-
ters: the Harmony game has 0 < s < 1 and 0 < t < 1; the
Stag-Hunt game has −1 < s < 0 and 0 < t < 1; the Pris-
oners Dilemma has −1 < s < 0 and 1 < t < 2; and the
Snowdrift game, also known as Chicken or Hawk-Dove
game, has 0 < s < 1 and 1 < t < 2. Depending on the
game being played, the players decide on the best strat-
egy based on how much they will win given all the pos-
sible strategies of the adversaries. For the uncorrelated
case, the objective is to maximize the expected payoff
by assigning a probability PC to playing C (to cooper-
ate), so that D (to defect) is played with the probability
1 − PC . A Nash equilibrium [17] is reached for a strat-
egy, i.e., a value of PC , that none of the players wants to
deviate from. If PC is 0 or 1, it is a pure Nash equilib-
rium, otherwise it is a mixed strategy equilibrium. The
mixed strategy solution is of particular importance in the
Snowdrift games. This game has two pure Nash equilib-
ria in which the players adopt opposite pure strategies,
but these cannot be reached without introducing correla-
tions between the players. Therefore, the best solution is
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2a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, where the probability
of playing C for each player is P ∗C = s/ (t+ s− 1).
This solution for the Snowdrift game is the best that
the players can do without communicating, but, for most
parameters, better results are obtained if they can both
play opposite strategies systematically. This, however,
requires the introduction of correlations between the
players. To illustrate this, we consider the extreme ex-
ample of a simple traffic light on a cross-road. The cross-
road can also be described as a Snowdrift game, where
the best payoffs are obtained when one of the drivers
decides to stop (to cooperate) and the other decides to
go (to defect). Since the players cannot communicate,
a traffic light is needed to achieve the optimal situation.
The traffic light can be seen as the correlation device,
which assigns a publicly known probability pµν to a cer-
tain state µν, with Greek indices taking the values C and
D. In this particular example, the device assigns equal
probabilities to the states CD and DC, while assigning
zero probability to CC and DD. Since the correlation is
very strong and there is a big penalty if both players de-
fect simultaneously, the players always want to follow the
correlation device, and the game is thus in a ”correlated
equilibrium”. A general correlation device, however, as-
signs non-zero probabilities to all the possible outcomes
of a game. If this is the case for the states with low pay-
off, the question arises whether always following is the
best strategy for the players. According to the existing
theory [18], they should always follow the correlation de-
vice if they are in correlated equilibrium, and they should
fall back to the uncorrelated mixed-strategy solution oth-
erwise. This ensures that the probabilities in correlated
equilibrium coincide with the final distribution of out-
comes, such that they represent the actual statistics of
the game. Another way of representing any symmet-
ric, and thus possibly correlated, probability distribution
over the four possible states is through a Boltzman distri-
bution of an Ising system. Let each player be represented
by a particle with spin, and let C and D correspond to
the spin states ”up” and ”down”, such that µ, ν ∈ {↑, ↓}.
We can rewrite the probabilities as
pµν =
e−βHµν
Z
, (1)
with β the inverse of a generalized thermal energy, Hµν
the Hamiltonian of the Ising system, decomposable into
the sum of a constant term that can be absorbed into
the partition function, an Ising term and a Zeeman term
[19], and Z =
∑
µ,ν e
−βHµν the partition function. Thus,
if the players always follow the instructions from the cor-
relation device, this distribution perfectly describes the
actions of the players.
To show that this is not the complete picture, we now
allow the players to deviate from the instructions of the
correlation device in a controlled manner. The decisions
to follow or not to follow the instructions become the
new actions that the players can take, while they are still
FIG. 1. Normalized payoff table for two-by-two, symmetric
coordination games.
not able to coordinate. To implement this, each player i
can follow with probability P iFµ, and thus not follow with
probability P iNFµ = 1− P iFµ the instruction µ that they
receive. These we call the ”response probabilities”. The
renormalized probability pRµν that a certain final state
µν is reached is given by the sum over the initial prob-
ability distribution weighted by the probability that the
initial states µ′ν′ gets converted to a specific final state
µν through the players’ response. Hence [20–23]
pRµν =
∑
µ′,ν′
P 1µ←µ′P
2
ν←ν′pµ′ν′ , (2)
with P iµ←µ′ the probability that player i is told to play
µ′ but plays µ. As an example, the probability that the
final state is CC is now
pRCC = P
1
FCP
2
FCpCC + P
1
FCP
2
NFDpCD
+ P 1NFDP
2
FCpDC + P
1
NFDP
2
NFDpDD. (3)
The expected payoff of a player is given by the payoffs
averaged over the renormalized probabilities, which de-
pends linearly on the response probabilities of that player
as
〈ui〉 =
∑
µ,ν
uiµνp
R
µν = CCP
i
FC + CDP
i
FD + CE , (4)
with uiµν the payoff of player i in the state µν. Here the
coefficients CC , CD and CE depend linearly on the initial
correlation probabilities and on the response probabilities
of the other player.
3FIG. 2. Symmetric correlations and associated equilibrium response strategies for the Snowdrift game with s = 0.5 and t = 1.2.
A, Illustration of all correlated Nash equilibria of the Snowdrift game in the PCC−PDD plane, for parameters representative of
s > t−1. B, Schematic representation of the equilibrium value of the response probabilities in the PFD−PFC plane that can be
found in each region enumerated in A. The lines that separate each region in A are obtained by imposing a particular sign on
a slope of a response probability and using the associated value for that probability. Between each straight line and the curved
line, given by pDD = 1 + pCC + 2
√
pCC , there exists a solution with one of the slopes strictly greater or smaller than zero and
the other one equal to zero, such that one of the response probabilities is 0 or 1 and we can find a value for the other probability
that lies between these values. Each response probability associated with a zero slope can have values that range between the
value of the other probability in the extreme and its associated mixed-strategy solution (due to the limiting condition that
pDD ≤ 1− pCC), represented in B by the dotted line. Bellow the lines, both slopes have the same sign and both probabilities
are in the same extreme of the interval. The arrows in B depict how the value of the probabilities change as we move from the
straight lines towards the curved line, which when reached sends the probabilities to the uncorrelated mixed-strategy solution
that is always a solution in all regions. The upper line that delimitates regions I and II and the rightmost line that delimitates
region II are the lines that arise when both slopes are positive. They correspond to the correlated equilibrium conditions. The
intersection of these two lines is the mixed-strategy solution when written as a response strategy. Thus in these two regions the
correlated equilibrium is a solution, although it is not unique or always optimal in payoff. Moreover, there are regions where
the correlated equilibrium is unstable but other solutions exist that make use of the correlations to increase the payoff. For
s < t− 1 the results are similar, but there occurs a swapping among the lines: the rightmost boundary of region I becomes the
leftmost, and the top boundary of region III becomes the bottom one, which changes the equilibria in regions II, III and VI
correspondingly. When s = t− 1 these boundaries overlap and these regions disappear.
A Nash equilibrium in the response strategy is achieved
if there is no incentive for player i to change the probabil-
ities P iFµ. This is achieved by imposing that the slope of
the expected payoff with respect to each response prob-
ability, either CC or CD in the evaluation of the total
player’s payoff, is zero, unless the equilibrium response
probability is 0 or 1, in which case the slope should be
negative or positive, respectively. The intuition is that
equilibrium is reached when the payoff of the players
cannot be improved anymore by changing their own re-
sponse probabilities while keeping those of the other play-
ers fixed at the equilibrium values. The independence of
this analysis separately for each response probability rep-
resents Bayes rationality [18] of the players towards the
final states given the initial information that they receive.
As a result, there are three possible Nash equilibria
for each response probability: PFµ = 0, PFµ = 1 and
0 < PFµ < 1. In our two by two coordination games, this
amounts to nine possible types of equilibrium response
strategies, but which ones are actually realized depends
on the payoff parameters. We find that the conditions
where ”always follow”, i.e., PFµ = 1 is a stable solution,
correspond to the Bayes rational conditions of the cor-
related equilibrium, indicating that this is only one pos-
sible response equilibrium. However, each renormalized
set of probabilities generates a new correlated game for
which the response equilibrium exactly matches a corre-
lated equilibrium, from which the players by definition
indeed do not want to deviate. Using the slopes CC
and CD to evaluate the Nash equilibria, each of the re-
sponse probabilities has to be subject to one of the three
above-mentioned conditions simultaneously. To guaran-
tee that none of the players wants to deviate, each slope
is calculated assuming that the response probabilities of
4FIG. 3. Equilibrium response strategies with highest payoff per region, for different parameters. A, Equilibria corresponding to
highest payoff by region, for s = 0.5 and t = 1.2 (s > t− 1), without the mixed-strategy solution. B, Equilibria corresponding
to highest payoff, for the same parameters as A, including the mixed-strategy solution. C, Equilibria corresponding to highest
payoff by region, for s = 0.23 and t = 1.5 (s < t− 1), including the mixed-strategy solution. The existing equilibrium solutions
are compared within a region, according to the description in fig. 2. The darkening of the colors represents a higher absolute
value of the payoff when compared to the best payoffs of the neighboring regions, but the actual value changes within the
region, except for the mixed-strategy solution, of which the is constant. All the payoffs corresponding to the best solution are
connected to one another. As the parameters vary, the blue solution in region II and the orange solution in region III either
increases or decreases in area. In b we see that the mixed strategy can be the best solution for a game with strong off-diagonal
correlations, but this is not generally the case for all parameters. In the regions where the correlated equilibrium exists, there is,
for certain initial probabilities, a better alternative solution. All the renormalized games will correspond to final probabilities
where the correlated equilibrium is the best solution, such that the players do not want to deviate anymore from their chosen
strategy. Because the mixed-strategy payoff is a constant, we see that correlations always provide a payoff that is at least as
good.
the other players are in equilibrium, such that a self-
consistent solution is obtained.
We studied the response strategies of the Snowdrift
game for all initial (symmetric) correlation probabilities
and show the results in Fig. 2. In addition to the ex-
pected existence of a correlated equilibrium region, where
interestingly also other Nash equilibria exist, we see other
regions with other types of equilibria that use correlations
to optimize the payoff. The mixed strategy of the uncor-
related Snowdrift game is always an equilibrium solution
in every region.
To choose the best response for each region, we com-
pare in Fig. 3 the payoffs of all the possible response
equilibria. In the correlated equilibrium region, we see
that there sometimes exist other solutions that have bet-
ter payoffs. This can be intuitively understood from our
cross-road example where the strategy ”always not fol-
low” has identical payoff to ”always follow”.
Having found the optimal response probabilities, we
can now incorporate them in the Ising model that effec-
tively describes the final statistics of the game. Using the
language of statistical physics, the response probabilities
in equilibrium can be written as
P iµ←µ′ =
e−βB
i
µ←µ′
Ziµ′
, (5)
with the partition function given by
Ziµ′ =
∑
µ
e−βB
i
µ←µ′ , (6)
where Biµ←µ′ are the appropriate energies that are ex-
plicitly given in the Methods section. The renormalized
correlated probabilities, by eq.1, are written in closed
form as
pRµν =
e−βH
R
µν
ZR
. (7)
Using eqs.1, 5 and 7, we are able to describe the renor-
malized Ising Hamiltonian as
HRµν = −
1
β
ln
∑
µ′ν′
Z1−µ′Z
2
−ν′e
−β(B1µ←µ′+B2ν←ν′+Hµ′ν′)
 .
(8)
The minus sign indicates the opposite play, i.e., −C = D
and −D = C, or the corresponding interchange be-
tween spin states ”up” and ”down”. The renormalized
5Hamiltonian is obtained by the players choosing the
energy parameters Biµ←µ′ independently, which in this
formalism is what allows the players to have complete
control over the final probabilities. How eqs.5 and 8 are
obtained is explicitly explained in the Methods section.
Note that if eq.8 is interpreted as a renormalization-
group transformation, the Nash equilibria correspond to
the fixed points of this transformation [19].
Discussion - The introduction of the response strategy
to correlated games opens up several new features. We
showed that the correlated equilibrium is only a particu-
lar response equilibrium, but that other Nash equilibria
exist. These new equilibria renormalize to a correlated
equilibrium even if the initial game is out of correlated
equilibrium, showing that the players even then can still
use the correlations to achieve a better payoff. The ex-
tra information in the correlations is two-fold: either the
final distributions of outcomes informs us about an un-
derlying correlation structure, or the players can inde-
pendently improve on externally imposed initial corre-
lations, motivated by stability and payoff maximization.
Regarding evolutionary game theory, the correlated Evo-
lutionary Stable Strategy [21, 24] is, similarly, only one
equilibrium where the agents always follow the correla-
tions, which suggests that the evolutionary stable solu-
tion is not unique. Other possible applications involve
modeling emergent behavior when games are played on
networks [8, 10, 11, 25, 26]. While all the related research
relies on numerical methods, our approach may provide
some analytical insight to the results, since for the two-
player game the renormalized probabilities of the optimal
Nash equilibrium are equivalent to an Ising Model in a
magnetic field. We show how the players can introduce
an energy parameter to change the Hamiltonian to effec-
tively obtain the renormalized probabilities. This sug-
gests that statistical-physics tools can be used to model
a simple network [27], but it remains as an interesting
open question how well this would describe the non-local
network effects. Bridging the gap between correlated and
uncorrelated games will also prove useful to better model
decision-making in economics, since the response proba-
bilities allow us to include interactions between agents
that influence their decisions.
Appendix A: Slope analysis for the Snowdrift Game
In eq.4 we have an expression for the expected payoff of player 1, with the coefficients CC and CD. To make the vari-
ous dependencies clearer, we now denote these explicitly as CC
(
pCC , pDD, P
2
FC , P
2
FD
)
and CD
(
pCC , pDD, P
2
FC , P
2
FD
)
,
respectively.
For the Snowdrift game, which is a symmetric game, it is natural to assume also a symmetric probability distribution,
so pCD = pDC = (1− pCC − pDD) /2. When both slopes are positive, the equilibrium will be at P 1FC = 1 and P 1FD = 1,
and due to the symmetry of the game, player 1 will not want to change these probabilities when player 2 has the
same equilibrium probabilities. To reach equilibrium, the conditions thus become
{
CC (pCC , pDD, 1, 1) > 0,
CD (pCC , pDD, 1, 1) > 0.
(A1)
These conditions are equivalent to the correlated equilibrium conditions. Similarly, a second kind of equilibrium is
reached when the slopes are negative and the response probabilities are zero, i.e.,
{
CC (pCC , pDD, 0, 0) < 0,
CD (pCC , pDD, 0, 0) < 0.
(A2)
A third type of equilibrium exists when both slopes equate to zero
{
CC
(
pCC , pDD, P
1∗
FC , P
1∗
FD
)
= 0,
CD
(
pCC , pDD, P
1∗
FC , P
1∗
FD
)
= 0,
(A3)
for which the solution coincides with the mixed-strategy equilibrium solution, with P 1∗FC = P
2∗
FC = P
∗
C and P
1∗
FD =
P 2∗FD = P
∗
D. The last type of equilibria comes in four possible guises, consisting of one of the conditions being zero,
while the other is strictly positive or negative. For instance, we can have
{
CC
(
pCC , pDD, 1, P
1∗
FD
)
> 0
CD
(
pCC , pDD, 1, P
1∗
FD
)
= 0.
(A4a)
(A4b)
6If we calculate the specific value of the response probability using eq.A4b and substitute this value in eq.A4a, a new
condition arises for symmetric games, namely
pDD < 1 + pCC − 2√pCC . (A5)
Under this condition, and pDD ≤ 1−pCC , each equilibrium response probability that has a zero slope in the expected
payoff, has a limited range of possible values, which, depending on the sign of the associated inequality, goes from 1 or
0 to P ∗C or P
∗
D. Each of the four possible combinations correspond to one of the four response equilibria of this kind.
The solution of the example given above is P 1∗FC = 1 and P
∗
D < P
1∗
FD < 1, with the specific value of P
1∗
FD depending
on the initial correlated probabilities.
Due to the value of the Snowdrift game’s payoff parameters, the two other conditions that would arise from having
the two conditions with opposite strict inequalities do not have solutions, so only seven equilibria exist in total for
this game.
Note that in a game-theoretical notation, each of the above equilibrium conditions can be summarized as
∑
µ,ν,ν′
u1µνP
1∗
µ←µ′P
2∗
ν←ν′pµ′ν′ ≥
∑
µ,ν,ν′
u1µνP
1
µ←µ′P
2∗
ν←ν′pµ′ν′ .
These comprehend two conditions, one for every value of µ′. Summing over these shows that the expected payoff
of player 1 cannot be improved by deviating from the equilibrium strategy, which is the requirement for a Nash
equilibrium. The stronger statement that both conditions are satisfied separately expresses the Bayes rationality of
player 1.
Appendix B: Renormalized Ising Model
To insert the response probabilities in the Ising model, each reaction from the players will have a Zeeman-like
energy: either −Biµ if they follow µ, or +Biµ if they do not follow:
Biµ←µ′ = −δµµ′Biµ + (1− δµµ′)Biµ. (B1)
We can then rewrite the response probabilities as
P iµ←µ′ =
δµµ′e
βBi
µ′ + (1− δµµ′)e−βB
i
µ′
Ziµ′
=
e−βB
i
µ←µ′
Ziµ′
, (B2)
with Ziµ′ as given in eq.6. Using eq.2, we calculate the renormalized Ising energies:
HRµν = −
1
β
ln
(
ZR pRµν
)
= − 1
β
ln
∑
µ′,ν′
P 1µ←µ′P
2
ν←ν′pµ′ν′
− 1
β
ln
(
ZR
)
Introducing eq.B2 and the initial correlation probabilities with energies Hµ′ν′ , with associated partition function Z,
we get a simplified version of the renormalized energies:
HRµν = −
1
β
ln
(
ZR
ZZ1CZ
1
DZ
2
CZ
2
D
)
− 1
β
ln
(
Z1DZ
2
De
−β(B1µ←C+B2ν←C+HCC)
+Z1DZ
2
Ce
−β(B1µ←C+B2ν←D+HCD) + Z1CZ
2
De
−β(B1µ←D+B2ν←C+HDC)
+Z1CZ
2
Ce
−β(B1µ←D+B2ν←D+HDD)
)
. (B3)
The first term in eq.B3 drops out because we have that
7ZR = ZZ1CZ
1
DZ
2
CZ
2
D. (B4)
Hence, we can rewrite HRµν as in eq.8. The fact that the renormalized partition function is a product of the various
partition functions expresses that the actions of the players enter the renormalized Hamiltonian in an independent
manner.
Appendix C: Background on Game Theory
1. Strategic-Form Games
A strategic form game is defined by three elements: the finite set I of I players, with I = {1, 2, ..., I}; the pure-
strategy space Si for each player i ∈ I, representing the plays that each player has available; and the payoff functions
ui(si, s−i), denoting the gain of player i if he plays si ∈ Si and the other players, denoted by −i, play s−i ∈ S−i.
Besides the pure strategies, the players can play a mixed strategy, in which player i plays the pure strategy si with
probability σi(si). A pure strategy is a particular case of a mixed strategy, that assigns probability 1 to a certain
element of the pure-strategy space.
The players do not have access to what their opponents will play, so the rational player has to consider all his
possible moves. Taking this into account, the Nash equilibrium guarantees that each player chooses a strategy from
which they do not want to deviate. A mixed strategy profile σ∗i is the Nash equilibrium if for all players i we have
that their average payoff obeys
〈ui〉(σ∗i , σ∗−i) ≥ 〈ui〉(σi, σ∗−i), (C1)
with σi ∈ Σi any element of the set of all possible mixed strategy profiles. Since a set of probabilities is convex and
compact, it is enough to guarantee that
〈ui〉(σ∗i , σ∗−i) ≥ 〈ui〉(si, σ∗−i). (C2)
for all si ∈ Si.
If the inequality is strict, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium ensues. In symmetric, two by two, two strategy games,
i.e., Si = {C,D} where C denotes to cooperate and D to defect, Nash equilibria are easy to categorize. For the
Harmony Game (HG) both players cooperate; in the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) both defect, and the Stag-Hunt game
(SH) has both these two equilibria. The Snowdrift Game (SG), also called Chicken or Hawk-Dove, has two pure
strategy Nash equilibria, where one of the players cooperates and the other defects, but these are impossible to
achieve, due to the symmetry of the game. The best strategy for this game is a mixed-strategy equilibrium, which
assigns an equal probability to cooperate to each player.
In the games that we will analyze, there are only two actions and two players, so σi = PCi with i = 1, 2, and we
rewrite the equilibrium in eq. (C1) as
〈u1〉(P ∗C1 , P ∗C2) ≥ 〈u1〉(PC1 , P ∗C2). (C3)
Expanding, we get in first instance
P ∗C1P
∗
C2u1(C,C) + P
∗
C1(1− P ∗C2)u1(C,D) + (1− P ∗C1)P ∗C2u1(D,C) + (1− P ∗C1)(1− P ∗C2)u1(C,C)
≥PC1P ∗C2u1(C,C) + PC1(1− P ∗C2)u1(C,D) + (1− PC1)P ∗C2u1(D,C) + (1− PC1)(1− P ∗C2)u1(C,C).
Subtracting the left-hand side from the right-hand side gives
(
P ∗C1 − PC1
) (
P ∗C2u1(C,C) + (1− P ∗C2)u1(C,D)
)
+
(
PC1 − P ∗C1
) (
P ∗C2u1(D,C) + (1− P ∗C2)u1(D,D)
) ≥ 0, (C4)
which after rearrangement of the terms gives the desired result
(
P ∗C1 − PC1
) [
P ∗C2 (u1(C,C)− u1(D,C)) + (1− P ∗C2) (u1(C,D)− u1(D,D))
] ≥ 0. (C5)
8For this condition to hold, the coefficient of
(
P ∗C1 − PC1
)
has to have the same sign as
(
P ∗C1 − PC1
)
itself. Hence,
if PC1 is bigger than P
∗
C1
, the coefficient has to be non-negative, and otherwise, non-positive. The condition in eq.
(C5) has to hold for all values of PC1 and so, for the case when P
∗
C1
is not in one of the extremes of the interval,(
P ∗C1 − PC1
)
can be positive, negative or zero. The only way to ensure that the condition is always true is if it is
always zero, meaning that the coefficient has to be zero or
P ∗C2u1(C,C) + (1− P ∗C2)u1(C,D) = P ∗C2u1(D,C) + (1− P ∗C2)u1(D,D). (C6)
We can thus calculate that the mixed strategy equilibrium probability P ∗C2 by solving
〈u1〉 (1, P ∗C2) = 〈u1〉 (0, P ∗C2). (C7)
If P ∗C1 is in one of the extremes, then the condition becomes a strict inequality and we obtain a pure strategy
equilibrium.
The conditions of the probabilities are those of Kakutani’s Theorem, used by Nash to prove the existence of the
fixed points that we now know as ”Nash Equilibria” [17]. Analyzing the slope of the probability PC1 in the same way
as done in our paper for the response probabilities proves the same result.
2. Correlated Games and Correlated Equilibrium
Suppose that the players made some agreement beforehand about what they will play, or that there is some external
information that both share even if they do not communicate. This idea is formalized by extending the game with a
correlation device. This device draws one of the possible final states, the true state ω ∈ Ω, with probability p(ω) and
subsequently informs each player of what they should play to achieve the true state ω. Player i then has information
hi(ω) ∈ Hi, that is, he knows what true states are possible given the information he received. The probability that
each of these states is the true state is given by p(ω|hi). In the case of the coordination game described above
Ω = {CC,CD,DC,DD} and, for example, h1(CD) = C and {ω|h1} = {CC,CD}. This means that if the true state
is CD, player 1 is told to play C, at which point he knows that either CC or CD are the possible true states. A
correlated strategy s(ω) represents what pure or mixed strategy each player adopts in the true state ω. The probability
distribution s(ω) is the same as the initial distribution p(ω) of plays if the players always play according to what they
are told.
The players have Bayesian rationality, which means that if we look at the final action of a certain player, their
payoff conditioned on the fact that that was the information that they received from the correlation device must be
greater than the payoff they could have achieved if he played something else, given the same information:
∑
{ω|hi}
ui(si(ω), s−i(ω))p(ω|hi) ≥
∑
{ω|hi}
ui(s¯i(ω), s−i(ω))p(ω|hi), (C8)
which must be valid for all players i, all information structures hi(ω) and all pure strategies s¯i(ω). We say that the
players are Bayes rational towards the state of the world ω.
If we sum over hi(ω) after having multiplied with the corresponding probability, we arrive at∑
ω
ui(si(ω), s−i(ω))p(ω) ≥
∑
ω
ui(s¯i(ω), s−i(ω))p(ω). (C9)
When these conditions are met, s(ω) is the final distribution in equilibrium, which means that it is the same distribution
as the correlation probabilities, that the players always follow. Hence this is the correlated equilibrium distribution.
The condition in Eq. (C8) states that the players only need to maximize their payoff for the information they possess
in a particular moment, without considering alternative information, the latter happening in eq. (C9). The conditions
that arise from eq. (C8) are the correlated equilibrium conditions. In the above example, we have for player 1 only
that s¯1 = D, so the condition is
p(CC) [u1(C,C)− u1(D,C)] + p(CD) [u1(C,D)− u1(D,D)] ≥ 0.
9Appendix D: Response Strategy in Game Theory
1. Response Probabilities
We introduce the responses as a new game that the players engage in, this time about playing for or against the
advised move. We retain the notion of the correlation device and without loss of generality assume we only have two
players, such that the initial correlations are given by p(ω′), with ω′ ∈ {µ′ν′} and thus µ′ the available instructions
for player i, ν′ the available instructions for player −i, and both µ′, ν′ ∈ {C,D}. In this new game, the ”pure”
strategies available to the players are to either follow the indications or to not follow them, i.e., Fµ′ and NFµ′ . We
assign uncorrelated probabilities to the players following or not following the correlation device, PFµ′ = 1 − PNFµ′ ,
which we call the response probabilities. Each instruction that the players can obey creates a new probability variable.
A response strategy is defined as ρ(ω′) = {PFµ′ , PFν′}. The final distribution of outcomes is represented by a
renormalized correlated game with ω ∈ {µν} and
pR(ω) =
∑
ω′
Pµ,µ′Pν,ν′p(ω
′), (D1)
where the transition probability
Pµ,µ′ = δµ,µ′PFµ′ + (1− δµ,µ′)PNFµ′ (D2)
is a function of PFµ′ .
With this formulation, we allow for a continuum of reactions from the players to the correlations. The average
payoff of player i is given by
〈ui〉R =
∑
ω
ui(ω)p
R(ω) ≡
∑
ω′
uRi (ω
′) p(ω′), (D3)
with
uRi (ω
′) =
∑
ω
ui(ω)Pµ,µ′Pν,ν′ (D4)
and ui(ω) as shorthand for ui(si(ω), s−i(ω)). This result is also equivalent to calculating the convex combination of
the uncorrelated games obtained using PFµ′ or PNFµ′ as the probabilities of playing the recommended pure strategy
and averaging the payoffs with p(ω′).
2. Slope Analysis in Game Theory
We can rewrite the slope conditions derived in our paper in formal game-theoretical notation as∑
ω,ν′
ui(ω)P
∗
µ,µ′P
∗
ν,ν′p(ω
′) ≥
∑
ω,ν′
ui(ω)Pµ,µ′P
∗
ν,ν′p(ω
′), (D5)
where P ∗µ,µ′ = Pµ,µ′
(
P ∗Fµ′
)
. Substituting eq. (D2), we get
∑
ω,ν′
ui(ω)
[
δµ,µ′P
∗
Fµ′ + (1− δµ′,µ)P ∗NFµ′
]
P ∗ν,ν′p(ω
′) ≥
∑
ω,ν′
ui(ω)
[
δµ,µ′PFµ′ + (1− δµ,µ′)PNFµ′
]
P ∗ν,ν′p(ω
′),
and after performing the sum over µ we obtain∑
ν,ν′
P ∗ν,ν′p(ω
′)
[(
P ∗Fµ′ − PFµ′
)
ui(µ
′ν) +
(
P ∗NFµ′ − PNFµ′
)
ui(µν)
]
≥ 0
⇔
(
P ∗Fµ′ − PFµ′
)∑
ν,ν′
P ∗ν,ν′p(ω
′) (ui(µ′ν)− ui(µν)) ≥ 0. (D6)
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The coefficient of
(
P ∗Fµ′ − PFµ′
)
is the general form of the slopes that we analyze. Clearly when u(µν) > u(µ′ν) the
overall condition is satisfied if player i follows µ′ with zero probability, which results in a new equilibrium.
Let us assume µ′ = C, meaning that the information that player 1 received was C. Substituting in the above, we
obtain (
P ∗FC1 − PFC1
)(
p(CC)
[
P ∗FC2 (u1(CC)− u1(DC)) + P
∗
NFC2
(u1(CD)− u1(DD))
]
+ p(CD)
[
P ∗FD2 (u1(CD)− u1(DD)) + P
∗
NFD2
(u1(CC)− u1(DC))
])
≥ 0.
If the probabilities of following of both players are equal to 1 we recover the correlated equilibrium condition given
as an example in the main part of the paper. This shows that the expected correlated equilibrium is only one of the
possible equilibria emerging from the response probabilities.
3. Response Strategy and Nash Equilibrium
The fact that we do not sum over µ′ in eq. D5 highlights that we have an independent condition for every response
probability. Nonetheless, since these probabilities are indeed independent, we can sum over µ′, resulting in∑
ω,ω′
ui (si(ω), s−i(ω))P ∗µ,µ′P
∗
ν,ν′p(ω
′) ≥
∑
ω,ω′
ui (si(ω), s−i(ω))Pµ,µ′P ∗ν,ν′p(ω
′)
⇔
∑
ω′
uRi
(
ρ∗i (ω
′), ρ∗−i(ω
′)
)
p(ω′) ≥
∑
ω′
uRi
(
ρi(ω
′), ρ∗−i(ω
′)
)
p(ω′).
Both probabilities in ρi(ω
′), namely PFCi and PFDi , are independent and each has the same properties as the prob-
ability distributions over the pure strategies that correspond to the mixed strategy distributions. They are convex
and compact in a finite-dimensional Euclidean space. By the same token as for the mixed strategy, we can be sure
to find a fixed point for the response strategies. More specifically, if P is the space of strategy profiles for PFµ , which
thus has a dimensionality equal to the number of possible values of µ, we can define a function called the ”reaction
correspondence” ri that maps each response strategy profile ρ to the set of response probabilities that maximize
player’s i payoff when his opponents play ρ−i. The reaction correspondence is defined as r : P → P . A fixed point
of r exists when the players do not have any incentive to change strategy, meaning that they cannot maximize their
payoff function any further. The fixed point ρ∗ is such that for each player ρ∗i ∈ ri(ρ∗). Thus, a fixed point of r
is a response equilibrium, of the same kind as the Nash equilibrium, but now with more probability distributions
associated to each player. The proof follows, therefore, analogously from Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
4. Response Strategy and Correlated Equilibrium
To show that the final game is in correlated equilibrium, we need to make sure that the players actually obey the
renormalized probabilities. If the information partitions of player i in two different states are the same, then what
player i has played in that state is the same as what he played in the other, which means that having hi(ω
a) = hi(ω
b)
for two otherwise different states ωa and ωb, is equivalent to having si(ω
a) = si(ω
b). The transition probabilities then
describe a mapping from following the initial correlation device to following the renormalized correlation device:
Phi,h′i = δhi,h′iPFh′i
+ (1− δhi,h′i)PNFh′i . (D7)
where we abbreviate hi(ω
′) to h′i and hi(ω) to hi. We can rewrite eq. (D5) as∑
ω,{ω′|h′i}
ui (si (ω) , s−i (ω)) (P ∗hi,h′i − Phi,h′i)P
∗
h−i,h′−i
p(ω′|h′i) ≥ 0. (D8)
Introducing eq. (D7) in eq. (D8) we get∑
ω,{ω′|h′i}
ui (si (ω) , s−i (ω))
(
δhi,h′i
(
P ∗Fh′
i
− PFh′
i
)
+ (1− δhi,h′i)
(
P ∗NFh′
i
− PNFh′
i
))
P ∗h−i,h′−ip(ω
′|h′i) ≥ 0.
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Now we realize that the sum over ω is equivalent to a sum over hi and h−i. Summing only over hi, we make the
transition probabilities effectively act on the payoff functions as
∑
h−i,{ω′|h′i}
(P ∗Fh′
i
− PFh′
i
)
ui (si (ω
′) , s−i (ω))︸ ︷︷ ︸
hi=h′i
+
(
P ∗NFh′
i
− PNFh′
i
)
ui
(
si
(
ω¯′
)
, s−i (ω)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
hi 6=h′i
P ∗h−i,h′−ip(ω′|h′i) ≥ 0.
Simplifying, we arrive at an equation analogous to eq. (D6), namely(
P ∗Fh′
i
− PFh′
i
) ∑
h−i,{ω′|h′i}
[
ui (si (ω
′) , s−i (ω))− ui
(
si
(
ω¯′
)
, s−i (ω)
)]
P ∗h−i,h′−ip(ω
′|h′i) ≥ 0. (D9)
We now turn our attention to the coefficients of
(
P ∗Fh′
i
− PFh′
i
)
. Looking at the extreme values of P ∗Fh′
i
, we can
make the following observations:
• P ∗Fh′
i
= 1:
(
P ∗Fh′
i
− PFh′
i
)
is non-negative, such that its coefficient must be positive. In this case, P ∗hi,h′i = δhi,h
′
i
,
which means that we can multiply by this factor and reinstate the sum over hi and substitute ω
′ by ω and ω¯′
by ω¯;
• P ∗Fh′
i
= 0:
(
P ∗Fh′
i
− PFh′
i
)
is non-positive, such that its coefficient must be negative. To have the sum be positive
again, we swap the signs of the payoff terms. Multiplying by P ∗hi,h′i = 1− δhi,h′i and again summing over hi, we
have the same expression as in the previous case, as now we need to substitute ω¯′ by ω and ω′ by ω¯;
• 0 < P ∗Fh′
i
< 1:
(
P ∗Fh′
i
− PFh′
i
)
can be either negative, positive or zero, which means that its coefficient has
to be equal to zero. Since that is the case, it is irrelevant which sign the payoff terms have, and so we can
multiply by P ∗hi,h′i and sum over hi freely. We then arrive again at the same formula, if we make either one of
the substitutions of the previous cases, but now equating to zero.
With this, we can thus rewrite the slope as∑
ω,{ω′|h′i}
P ∗hi,h′iP
∗
h−i,h′−i
p(ω′|h′i) [ui (si (ω) , s−i (ω))− ui (si (ω¯) , s−i (ω))] ≥ 0, (D10)
for any ω¯. Because the sum is not over h′i, the product of probabilities is equivalent to the conditioning of the
renormalized probability distribution on h′i, which leads to∑
{ω|h′i}
pR(ω|h′i) [ui (si (ω) , s−i (ω))− ui (si (ω¯) , s−i (ω))] ≥ 0, (D11)
such that if the response strategies are in Nash equilibrium, then the final distribution is Bayes rational towards the
state of the world ω. Multiplying by Ph′i and summing over h
′
i gives∑
ω
pR(ω) [ui (si (ω) , s−i (ω))− ui (si (ω¯) , s−i (ω))] ≥ 0. (D12)
If the target final distribution is the same as that of s(ω), then the action corresponding to playing accordingly to a
different final distribution is equivalent to playing a different action in Si with respect to the final distribution, such
that si (ω¯) = s¯i(ω), and we arrive at∑
ω
pR(ω) [ui (si (ω) , s−i (ω))− ui (s¯i(ω), s−i (ω))] ≥ 0, (D13)
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which is a game with a renormalized distribution that is in correlated equilibrium. With this we can conclude that if
the response strategies are in equilibrium, then the final distribution is a correlated equilibrium.
The players are Bayes rational towards the initial world when they both want to follow, since ω = ω′. When that
is not the case, the response probabilities allow them to find a world towards which they want to be rational. Thus
we see that the response probabilities create a condition for which the main theorem in [18] applies.
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